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EXTRA-TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF RECEIVERS.
A RECEIVER is appointed by the court. He is removable by it.
He is an officer of the court. All his acts, as receiver, are those
of the court performed by an agent, so to speak. Any property
in the possession of a receiver is in oustodia legis-in charge of
the court and subject to its control. The receiver is but the
creature, "the hand," as has been aptly said, of tlie court. What,
then, are his powers outside of the jurisdiction of the court that
appoints him ?
It is obvionis that the powers of a receiver are limited by the
same boundaries that limit the powers of the court that appoints
him. What it cannot do, he cannot do. Property or persons
beyond the reach of the court are beyond the power of its agent,
the receiver. Since a receiver deals principally, if not entirely,
with property, and since his powers over it can only be those of the
court that gives him his official character, the first question is:
Has a court power to appoint a receiver to take possession of property beyond its jurisdiction? To this question an affirmative
reply may be given, subject to some limitations hereafter to be
noticed.
The question has been thus answered in cases of receiverships
of companies owning and operating railways in several states. In
.Ellisv. Boston, ft., Railroad Co., 107 Mass. 1, the court affirmed
VoL. XX.VI.-37
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the appointment of a receiver for the entire line of the defendant
company's road, which extended from Boston, Massachusetts, to
Fishkill, New York. The same point was decided the same way
in TRilmer v. Atlantic R. A. L. Co., 2 Woods 418, where the
defendant was a corporate body existing in two states and owning
property in three. Judge WooDs, said: "As the property of the
defendant company is one entire and indivisible thing, and as it is
all covered by one deed of trust, there seems to be no good reason
why this court should not appoint a receiver for the whole, even
though a pdrt of the property may extend into another s*tate. The
court having jurisdiction of the defendant can compel it to do all
in its power to put the receiver in possession of the entire property.
If other persons outside the territorial, jurisdiction of this court
have seized the property of defendant, the receiver may be compelled to ask the courts of that jurisdiction to aid him in obtaining
possession, but that is no reason why we should hesitate to appoint
a receiver for the whole property. We think the courts of other
jurisdictions would feel constrained, as a matter of comity, to afford
all necessary aid in their power to put the receiver of the court in
possession."
Admitting that a court may appoint a receiver for property outside of its jurisdiction, the question arises, how can such court
put its receiver in possession of such foreign property, and compel
recognition and observance of his rights in, and title to, such
property ?
As to property within the jurisdiction of the court
appointing
the receiver, the law is that his appointment per se gives him a
right to its possession. The law is the same as to property outside
of the jurisdiction of the court. Appointment per se gives a
receiver the right to its possession. And this right will be recognized by 'the courts of the foreign jurisdiction wherein such
property is situate. Thus in Bagby v. Atlantic, &c., Railroad Co.,
86 Penn. St. 291, the right of a foreign receiver to sue in Pennsylvania was affirmed. In Hurd v. City of Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L.
1, it was decided that the legal effect of the appointment of a
receiver in a foreign jurisdiction in transferring to him the right
to collect the property passing under his control by virtue of such
office, will be so far recognised by courts of this state [New Jersey]
as'to enable such officer to sustain a suit for the recovery of such
property, and as to the doctrine that a receiver going into a foreign
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jurisdiction should not be permitted to remove property of his
debtor situate in such foreign jurisdiction, the court were of opinion
that such doctrine "has no direct authority in its favor." So also
in Bunk v. St. John, 29 Barb. 585, the Supreme Court of New
York decided that receivers appointed in other states may sue as
such in the courts of New York.
These cases, however, are apparently contradicted by the following authorities, wherein it has been decided that a receiver cannot
bring an action in a court of foreign jurisdiction: Booth v. Clark,
17 How. 322; Farmers' & Mehanics' ins. Co. v. 2eedles, 52 Mo.
17. In Warren v. Union NYat. Bank, 7 Phila. 156, A., a citizen
of Kentucky, attached the moneys of B., a citizen of Tennessee,
in the hands of C., a citizen of Pennsylvania. Prior to the issuing
of the attachment in Pennsylvania, a receiver had been appointed
by the Court of Chancery in Tennessee, of all the estate and effects
of B. It was decided that the attaching-creditor was entitfed to
the money in preference to the receiver, and the court intimated
that a receiver is but an appointee of the court from which he
derives his authority, and as receiver he has no extra-territorial
rights of action, and that the states of the Union, for all except
national purposes, are to be regarded as foreign and independent
of each other. See also Hope Hfut. L. . Co. v. Taylor, 2 Rob.
278. And again, State v. J. P. & H. Railroad Co., 15 Fla. 202,
decided that under the constitution and laws of Florida a receiver
cannot be appointed by the judge of one circuit to take possession
of railway property located in another.
In Willitts v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577, it was decided that the
acceptance by a corporation of a charter, whereby, upon its committing an act of insolvency, all its property is to vest forthwith in
receivers, to be distributed in a prescribed mode, does not give to
the transfer thus effected the character of a voluntary conveyance
by the corporation to the receivers, under which they might sue in
a foreign state. It was held that such receivers took the assets of
the bank in New York subject to the claims of creditors who had
attached them subsequent to the act of insolvency.
Hunt v. Colombian Ins. Co., 55 Me. 290, lays down the doctrine
that the legal authority of receivers, duly appointed in another
state, is co-extensive with the jurisdiction of the court by which
he is appointed, and asserts the precedence and priority of creditors
of Maine who attach property of the insurance company in Maine,
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as against the claims of a New York receiver of the company.
See also Taylor v. Colombian Ins. (Jo.,14 Allen 352. See also
Hoyt v. Thompson, 6 N. Y. 320.
The case of Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322, will perhaps be
recalled. In that case Mr. Justice WAYNE, speaking for the United
States Supreme Court says: "He [the receiver] has no extra-territorial power of official action; none which the court appointing
him can confer, with authority to enable him to go into a foreign
jurisdiction to take possession of the debtor's property; none which
can give him, upon the principle of comity, a privilege to sue in a
foreign court or another jurisdiction, as the judgment-creditor himself might have done where his debtor may be amenable to the
tribunal which the creditor may seek. In those countries of Europe
in which foreign judgments are regarded as a foundation for an
action, whether it be allowed by treaty stipulations or by comity,
it has not as yet been extended to a receiver in chancery. In, the
United States, where the same rule prevails between the states as
to judgments and decrees, aided as it is by the first section of the
4th article of tle Constitution and by the Act of Congress of 26th
May 1790, by which full faith and credit are to be given in all ,the
courts of the U. S., to the judicial sentences of the different states,
a receiver under a creditor's bill has not as yet been an actor as such
in a suitout of the state in which he was appointed. This court considered the effect of that section of the Constitution, and of the act
just mentioned in l~Ienoyle v. C0o]en, 13 Pet. 324, 327. But
apart from the absence of any such case, we think that a receiver
could not be admitted to the comity extended to judgment-creditors,
without an entire departure from chancery proceedings, as to the
manner of his appointment, the securities which are taken from
him for the performance of his duties, and the direction which the
court has over him in the collection of the estate of the debtor and
the application and distribution of them. If he seeks to be recognised in another jurisdiction, it is to take the fund there out of it,
without such court having any control of his subsequent action in
respect to it, and without his having even official power to give
security to the court, the aid of which he seeks for his faithful conduct and official accountability. All that could be done upon, such
an application from a receiver, according to chancery practice,
iwould be to transfer him from the locality of his appointment to that
where he asks to be recognised, for the execution of his trust in
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the last, under the coercive ability of that court; and that it would
be difficult to do, where it may be asked to be done, without the
court exercising its province to determine whether the suitor, or
another person within its jurisdiction, was a proper person to act
as receiver." ,
Here, then, are two conflicting classes of cases, one affirming
that a receiver may take possession of and sue for property in a
foreign jurisdiction, the other affirming that he may not do so.
How,if at all, may they be reconciled?
On examination, there appears to be this distinction between the
two classes: In the cases wherein the extra-territorial power of the
receiver was denied, its exercise was opposed by creditors of the
debtor resident in the foreign jurisdiction where the receiver sought
to act. In the cases where the extra-territorial power of receivers
was affirmed, there was no opposition to his action in the foreign
jurisdiction by creditors resident there-citizens of that jurisdiction. The rule affirming the extra-territorial power of receivers
is in no case asserted as against creditors and citizens of the foreign
jurisdiction wherein the receiver seeks to assert rights. On the
contrary, their rights are expressly reserved by the courts which,
while they affirm the extra-territorial power of the receiver, are
careful to remark that his action was opposed by no creditor
resident within their jurisdiction, and to affirm that it is their duty
to protect their own domestic creditors of the debtor, and to give
to them, in preference to the receiver, the prior right to the debtor's
property within their jurisdiction.
The distinction between allowing a foreign receiver to sue when
not opposed and refusing to allow him to sue when opposed, by
domestic creditors, was very clearly pointed 'out and insisted upon
in Hurd v. City of _Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. 1. Said Chief Justice
BEASLEY: "That the officer of a foreign court should not be permitted, as against the claims of creditors resident here [in New
Jersey], to remove from this state the assets of the debtor is a proposition that appears to be asserted by all the decisions, but that
similarly he should not be permitted to remove such assets when
creditors are not so interested, is quite a different affair, and it may
perhaps be safely said that this latter doctrine has no direct authority
in its favor." Again he says: "It [the power of a receiver to
sue] could not be exercised in a foreign jurisdiction to the disadvantage of creditors resident there, because it is the policy of
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every government to retain in its own hands the property of a
debtor until all domestic claims against it have been satisfied." In
Runk v. St. John, 29 Barb. 585, the Supreme Court of New York
by OLERKE, J., says : "All that has been settled by the decisions
referred to is that our courts will not sustain the lien of foreign
assignees or receivers in opposition to a lien created by attachment
under our own laws. In other words, we decline to extend our
wonted courtesy so far as to work detriment to citizens of our own
state who have been induced to give credit to the foreign insolvent.
But this question does not arise in the case before us. This is
not a contest between foreign creditors and domestic attaching
creditors."
Bagbyv. Atlantic, 1'c., Railroad Co., 86 Penn. St. 291, affirmed
the right of a foreign receiver to sue in Pennsylvania, expressly saving, however, the rights of creditor citizens of that state to defeat it.
"Our own citizens," said the court, "would be protected against the
extra-territorial act in a proper case, because they are not bound
by it, and our assistance given to the extra-territorial act resting
only in comity, would not be given at the expense of justice to
them :" per Asin]w, J., page 294.
The right of creditors to hold the property of their debtor against
a foreign receiver, and to subject it to the payment of their debts
appears to be recognised by a recent case in the United States
Supreme Court, wherein it was said: "If he [the creditor] has a
right, in a distinct suit to prosecute his demand to judgment, without leave of the court appointing the receiver, he would have the
right to enforce satisfaction of it. By virtue of his judgment he
could, unless restrained by injunction, seize upon the propufrty of the
trust or attach its credits. .f his judgment were recovered outside the territorialjurisdictionof the court by which the receiver
was appointed, he could do this, and the court which appointedthe
receiver and was administeringthe trust assets would be impotent
to restrain him." Per WooDs, J., in Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.
S. 128.
Some of the objections to a receiver being permitted to sue in
a foreign court may be noticed. In Booth v. Clark, supra, the
Supreme Court of the United States said: " If he [the receiver]
seeks to be recognised in another jurisdiction, it is to take the fund
there out of it, without such court having any control of his subsequent action in respect to it, and without his having even official
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power to give security to the court the aid of which he seeks for
his faithful conduct and official accountability."
As to the objection of a lack of security, may it not fairly be
replied that the court which appointed the receiver can take from
him sufficient security to indemnify against the loss of all the property placed in his charge-as well that outside the jurisdiction
of the court appointing the receiver as that within its jurisdiction ? Cannot creditors resort to that court and the security it
takes? Certainly the debtor can if necessary resort to the security
taken by the appointing court. He is already in that court, and
both himself and his creditor, may have the benefit of any security
that court may have taken. And if the security is sufficient and
available to all who may lose by the receiver's breach of trust,
what objection is there to allowing him to take possession of the
foreign property, and to seek the aid of the foreign court to do so.
It does not seem necessary, in order to do this, to transfer the
receiver to the foreign court, and to make him an officer of that
court. He may sue in his own 'name in the courts of the foreign
jurisdiction, basing his suit upon the title conferred upon him by
the court appointing him. Except as against their own creditors,
why should not foreign courts assist the receiver as a matter of
comity ? It is not perceived that any confusion or lack of security
results from applying these rules.
True, the foreign court whose aid is sought would not have control of the receiver. But another court, having already a sufficient
security against his misconduct, has control of him and can compel
performance of his duties. It is no hardship to compel the debtor
to look to the appointing court for protection against the receiver's
misconduct. The debtor is already in that court as a party to the
proceedings which resulted in the appointment of a receiver, as to
creditors, those resident in the jurisdiction wherein the receiver
seeks to take property, may have sufficient protection in their own
courts, who will niot, it must be remembered, permit the foreign
receiver to assert rights in opposition to theirs. Other than domestic creditors may as well be remitted- to the court appointing the
receiver.
A court appointing a receiver will by injunction restrain persons within its juriidiction from proceeding against foreign property
of the debtor in a foreign court. In 'Ft. 4 C. 1. Co. v. Vt.
C. R. Co., 46 Vt. 792, it is decided that the courts of Vermont
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will iestrain parties within their jurisdiction from prosecuting suits
in foreign courts to reach foreign property owned by a corporationrailway company---over which the Vermont court has appointed a,
receiver. And Bagby v. Atlantic, &c., Railroad Co., 86 Penn. St.
291, decides that where a receiver of a corporation has been
appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction in another state, a,creditor who resides in that state, and is bound by a decree of its
court appointing said receiver, cannot in an attachment-execution
recover assets of the corporation in Pennsylvania, which the receiver
claims. It has been decided that a receiver may prove a claim in
bankruptcy in the federal court of another district as fully as if
vested with his powers 'as receiver by virtue of a decree of a court
within the district in which the proceedings in- bankruptcy are
pending. Ex parte Norwood, 3 Bissell 504. And where a citizen
of one state has recognised the appointment of a receiver in another
state, by incurring obligations to him in his official capacity, as
l y giving him a mortgage, the receiver may maintain an action [of
foreclosure, for example] to enforce such obligation: lglehart v.
Beirce, 36 Ill. 133.
So' far the right of a receiver to sue for or take possession of
property in a foreign jurisdiction has been considered solely
with reference to the right to such property which he acquires by
appointment per se. But' of course 'his right to such property
depends upon his title to it; and this a receiver may get in other
ways 'than by appdintment as receiver. For example, the court
appointing him, having control of the debtor, may compel thelatter'tb execute to the receiver an assignment or other deed of the
property or such deed may be executed voluntarily to the receiver,
who theu 'may take possession of or recover the property, whether
at home or abroad, not as receiver but as grantee in the deed.
Thus in Graydon v. Chturch, 7 Mich. 36, the Supreme Court
of Michigan, in a case where under a creditor's bill, in the Court
of Chancery of New York, a receiver had been appointed; and the
debtor in pursuance of the order of the court made a general
assignment to the: receiver oif all his property, reciting in it the
pr6ceedings had in the cause, and the assignment was made in due
form for the transfer of an interest in lands under the Michigan
statutes, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided that the assignee
might file his bill in chancery, in 'Michigan, to 'foreclose a mortgage int6rest or to enforce !a right of redemption held by the
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debtor at the time of the assignment, in lands in Michigan.

The

court, by Judge ORRISTIANOY, said in substance, that the receiver

in such a case, sued not strictly in his official character as receiver,
by virtue of his appointment in New York, but as an assignee, holding
the legal interest in the property by virtue of the assignment of the
debtor.
Where property has once vested in an assignee or receiver by the
law of the state where the property is situated, the law of another
state will not divest him of his right to it if he should take it into such
state in the performance of his duty. A receiver appointed by a court
in such a case stands in the same position as an assignee or trustee
in insolvency. Thus where a receiver of an insolvent manufacturing corporation appointed by a court in New Jersey, took possession of its assets, and for the purpose of completing a bridge which
it had contracted to build in Connecticut, purchased iron with the
funds of the estate and sent it to that state, it was decided that the
iron was not open to attachment in Connecticut by a creditor
residing there: .Pond v. Cooke, 45 Conn. 126. See also Blake
Crusher Co. v. New Haven, 46 Id. 473.
Kilmer v. Hobart, 58 How. Pr. 452, decides that receivers
appointed in another state and operating a railway as such, but
having property in their hands as such in New York, cannot there
be sued; an attachment issued in such suit will be vacated.
And where 0. was appointed by a court in Arkansas receiver
of property of T., a defendant in a suit, and ordered to ship it to
Memphis for sale, and to hold the proceeds subject to the order
of the court, and did so ship it to Memphis, where it was attached
by creditors of T., it was decided that 0. could maintain an'action of
replevin in Tennessee notwithstanding he had not yet qualified and
given bond: Caqgill v. Wooldridge, 8 Baxter 580.
The substance of the law appears to be as follows: Any court
having jurisdiction of a debtor may appoint a receiver of his property, including as well that property which is without, as that
which is within the jurisdiction of 'uch court.
Property within the jurisdiction of the appointing court passes by
the appointment per s to the receiver who may assert his rights
thereto as receiver either in the court which appoints him or any
other court, foreign or domestic.
Property outside of the jurisdiction of the appointing court
passes by the appointment per se to the receiver, as against the
VOL.
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debtor and his privies to the appointment but not as against creditors of the debtor residing in the foreignf jurisdiction where the
property is situate. Courts of such foreign jurisdiction will protect the rights of their own creditors to the property of the debtor
that is within their jurisdiction, as against the receiver appointed
by another court.
When a receiver has once obtained rightful possession of the
.property he was appointed to take charge of, he'will not be deprived
of its possession, except by the court appointing him, even though.
he remove with it to a foreign jurisdiction. While there it can
not be taken by creditors of the insolvent who reside within that
jurisdiction.
The power of a receiver to sue for or possess himself of property
of his debtor in a, foreign jurisdiction appears to rest entirely on
comity. It has some economical reasons' in favor of it. One is
that it lessens expense, since it enables one receiver to take possession of the entire property, and saves litigation, which would be;
necessitated in case the receiver was not recognised in the foreign,
jurisdiction wherein he seeks to assert rights and the appointment
of a new receiver be required. Take the case of a receiver of a
railroad running through several states. If the receiver appointed
by one court may not take possession of the whole road, then
there must be a receiver appointed by a court in every jurisdiction
through which the railway runs. There must be the expense of
conducting costly litigation in several courts. Again, each court
may appoint different receivers, whose management of the railway
may not be at all harmonious. It certainly would be productive
of great confusion and expense for several courts and receivers to
control the same, property. But where property is situate in several
foreign jurisdictions the better way seems to be to compel the insolvent to execute a deed of assignment to the receiver. This would
give him a, better title than the court appointing the receiver could
confer, because, unlike the title passed by appointment, the receiver's
title by deed of assignment would be good even against creditors
residing in the jurisdiction of the foreign court whose assistance the
receiver might seek.
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